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SHORT REPORT
What’s so difficult with adopting imagined perspectives?
Marios N. Avraamides1 • Adamantini Hatzipanayioti1 • Alexia Galati1
 Marta Olivetti Belardinelli and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Abstract Research on spatial cognition suggests that
transformation processes and/or spatial conflicts may
influence performance on mental perspective-taking tasks.
However, conflicting findings have complicated our
understanding about the processes involved in perspective-
taking, particularly those giving rise to angular disparity
effects, whereby performance worsens as the imagined
perspective adopted deviates from one’s actual perspective.
Based on data from experiments involving mental per-
spective-taking in immediate and remote spatial layouts,
we propose here a novel account for the difficulty with
perspective-taking. According to this account, the main
difficulty lies in maintaining an imagined perspective in
working memory, especially in the presence of salient
sensorimotor information.
Keywords Perspective-taking  Spatial viewpoints 
Sensorimotor interference
What’s so difficult with adopting imagined
perspectives?
In our daily life, we frequently find ourselves in situations in
which we have to mentally adopt a spatial perspective other
than the one we physically occupy, whether to process
information that is perceptually available (e.g., as when
inspecting a map and imagining ourselves at a particular
orientation in a depicted intersection) or is stored in our
memory (e.g., as when imagining ourselves at a distal
location in our town in order to provide route directions).
Research on spatial cognition has documented that, in many
cases, such mental perspective-taking gets slower and more
prone to error as the imagined perspective adopted deviates
from our actual perspective—what has been termed as an
angular disparity effect. In the present paper, we examine
when and why this is the case. We briefly review two
accounts supported by the extant literature, and based on
data from our own research, we propose a novel hypothesis
for the difficulties associated with perspective-taking.
The mental transformation hypothesis
Studies on perceptual perspective-taking present partici-
pants with stimuli, such as human figures, at various ori-
entations and ask them to make laterality judgments (e.g.,
indicate whether the left vs. the right arm of the figure is
outstretched and whether an external object is placed on the
left or the right of the figure). Typical results show strong
correlations between response latency and the angular
deviation of the stimulus from the upright orientation.
Also, response latencies for back-facing figures (i.e., that
have the same facing orientation as the participant) are
generally shorter than for front-facing figures (e.g., Zacks
et al. 1999), further suggesting that most participants solve
the task by mentally transforming their own perspective to
the orientation of the figure before responding. These
findings therefore support the proposal that the difficulty of
perspective-taking emerges from the mental transformation
process entailed by the task (but see May and Wendt 2013).
If the mental transformation process is indeed responsi-
ble for the angular disparity effect observed in perspective-
taking, then providing information in advance about the to-
& Marios N. Avraamides
mariosav@ucy.ac.cy
1 Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus,
P.O. Box 20537, 1678 Nicosia, Cyprus
123
Cogn Process
DOI 10.1007/s10339-015-0728-3
Author's personal copy
be-adopted perspective should eliminate, or at least reduce,
the effect. A study by Sohn and Carlson (2003) examined
this hypothesis. In this study, participants viewed on each
trial a display with a top-down drawing of a table and five
names randomly arranged around it at pre-defined positions.
Participants were instructed to adopt the perspective of a
specified reference person and indicate from that perspec-
tive the position of a target person, using the verbal labels
‘‘near-left,’’ ‘‘near-right,’’ ‘‘far-left’’ and ‘‘far-right.’’ On
some trials, information about the perspective to be adopted
appeared before information about the target (advance-
viewpoint condition), whereas on others, this information
appeared following information about the target (advance-
target condition) (Exp. 1). SOAs were also manipulated (0,
200, 400, 600, 800 ms), under the rationale that, when
viewpoint information was available in advance, longer
SOAs would provide participants with sufficient time to
process and adopt the imagined perspective in anticipation
of the target. Compared to the advance-target condition, in
the advance-viewpoint condition, participants were faster to
respond and, importantly, the angular disparity effect was
reduced—although not completely eliminated—with
increasing SOAs. This finding suggests that mental trans-
formation processes can only partly account for the diffi-
culty in perspective-taking: On the one hand, advance
information about the to-be-adopted perspective presum-
ably permits people to transform their perspective, such that
they make a judgment from that perspective more quickly
later on; on the other hand, such advance information does
not entirely eliminate the cost of making judgments from
increasingly offset perspectives. Indeed, in a follow-up
experiment (Exp. 2), Sohn and Carlson (2003) provided
evidence that spatial conflicts during the response stage may
also play a role. In this experiment, participants responded
with keys on the keyboard arbitrarily associated with target
positions. Results showed that, although participants were
again faster to respond in the advance-viewpoint condition
compared to the advance-target condition, angular disparity
effects in the advance-viewpoint condition were completely
eliminated. Taken together, the findings from the two
experiments suggest that, at least with perceptual tasks, both
mental transformation processes and spatial conflicts at the
response level contribute to the difficulties associated with
mental perspective-taking.
The sensorimotor interference hypothesis
The role of spatial conflicts in perspective-taking was first
discussed by May in the context of his sensorimotor
interference hypothesis (May 1996; also May 2004). May
(2004) proposed two types of spatial conflicts. First, object
direction disparity (ODD) refers to spatial conflicts that
occur during response computation and are caused by the
discrepant location of the target as specified relative to the
observer’s actual and imaginal standpoints. May argued
that sensorimotor codes specifying actual locations are
automatically activated and interfere with the computation
of the location from imagined perspectives. In the case of
perspectives that entail imagined rotation but not transla-
tion, ODD is equal to the angular difference between the
actual and imagined perspectives. Second, head direction
disparity (HDD) refers to the difference between the actual
and the imagined heading of the observer at response
execution. HDD reflects the need to transform the com-
puted response vector to egocentric coordinates before
executing body-based responses such as pointing.
May (2004) provided evidence for the sensorimotor
interference hypothesis with a study examining partici-
pants’ memory about locations within their immediate
surroundings. In one experiment, participants stood in the
center of a layout and memorized the locations of objects
placed around them. Then, while blindfolded, participants
pointed toward object’s locations from imagined perspec-
tives, with information about the to-be-imagined perspec-
tive being provided in advance of target information
(SOAs: 1, 3, and 5 s). May (2004) hypothesized that if the
difficulties with perspective-taking occur at the early stage
of the imagination process as the mental transformation
hypothesis implies, then latency should decrease with
increasing SOAs and angular disparity effects should be
eliminated or reduced. In fact, when the imagined per-
spective was misaligned with the participant’s actual per-
spective, pointing errors and response latencies increased
monotonically with angular disparity and, although overall
response latencies decreased with increasing SOAs, there
was no interaction between SOA and angular disparity.
That is, even though the mental transformation hypothesis
can account for the poorer overall performance with
increasing angular disparity, which is consistent with the
mental transformation hypothesis, it cannot account for the
finding that advance-viewpoint information did not reduce
angular disparity effects. Instead, angular disparity effects
obtained here can be altogether attributed to the presence
of spatial conflicts between sensorimotor and imagined
perspectives during response computation and execution,
emerging from having to locate objects in the immediate
environment but from imagined perspectives.
Maintaining imagined perspectives
If spatial conflicts are responsible for the angular disparity
effects in May’s (2004) study, then why were the overall
response latencies still reduced with increasing SOAs? One
possibility is that large SOAs allowed participants to
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process the advance information and reduce cognitive load
for the subsequent processing of the target, even if they
could not adopt the perspective in advance. This cannot be
ruled out without a corresponding advance-target condi-
tion, which the experiment lacked. However, another
explanation is that participants did adopt the imagined
perspectives in the long SOAs trials but failed to maintain
them until the target became available; nevertheless, this
could allow them to re-adopt the perspective faster when
the target appeared.
Our proposal here is that in testing situations such as
those of May (2004), spatial conflicts in the form of ODD
influence response computation by interfering with the
cognitive processes required to maintain an imagined per-
spective in working memory. Maintaining an imagined
perspective even for a short time is crucial for computing a
non-egocentric response vector. In our view, angular dis-
parity effects reflect the increasing difficulty of the mental
transformation with larger rotations, but critically the out-
put of that transformation process may not be maintained
active in working memory when spatial conflicts exist.
Such conflicts are expected to be stronger and harder to
suppress, even with large SOAs, in situations where the
observer is embedded in the memorized layout and thus
maintains self-to-object relations in a transient spatial
representation (Avraamides and Kelly 2008).
Compatible with this conjecture are the findings of a
study we recently conducted in our laboratory (Avraamides
et al. 2013). Motivated by previous evidence that sensori-
motor influences are diminished when reasoning about
remote environments (e.g., Kelly et al. 2007; Avraamides
and Kelly 2010), we set out to compare the influence of
advance-viewpoint information on the angular disparity
effects when reasoning about remote versus immediate
environments. The experiments involved studying a layout
of six objects placed at different positions around the
participants in a square virtual environment, presented
through a virtual reality head-mounted display. Following
encoding, participants’ memory was tested though a series
of trials that involved pointing to objects from imagined
perspectives. The order in which viewpoint and target
information was presented varied as in Sohn and Carlson
(2003), although in our study, participants carried out the
task in a self-paced manner (i.e., they pressed a key on the
joystick to request the next piece of information). In one
experiment (Exp. 2), participants completed testing in the
same environment used for learning, after all objects were
removed. In another experiment (Exp. 3), they were
immersed in a different virtual environment for testing.
Results revealed that when testing took place in a different
environment, advance-perspective information eliminated
angular disparity effects for perspectives at canonical
directions of the egocentric reference frame of participants
(i.e., objects on the participant’s left, right, and back) and
reduced them for objects in the diagonal directions (e.g.,
front right). In contrast, although overall response latency
was shorter with advance-perspective information com-
pared to advance-target, angular disparity effects persisted,
without any reduction, when participants were tested in the
learning environment.
Our interpretation of these findings is that in remote
testing, where sensorimotor information about the actual
physical orientation is reduced, participants are better able
to maintain an imagined perspective in anticipation of the
target, leading to the elimination of angular disparity
effects at least for perspectives at canonical directions. The
residual disparity effect for the diagonal directions could
reflect either an HDD cost (i.e., transforming a response
vector to egocentric coordinates might have been more
difficult from non-canonical perspectives) or some
remaining difficulty in maintaining the non-canonical
perspectives for a prolonged period of time. Altogether, the
shorter latency for the advance-perspective condition cou-
pled with the persisting angular disparity effect when
participants were tested in same environment, suggests that
participants’ main difficulty likely was to maintain the
imagined perspective without having perceptual support
regarding the objects’ locations.
The perceptual task of Sohn and Carlson (2003)
involves an intermediate situation between the two testing
conditions of our own study, as participants were disem-
bedded from the layout but had visual access to it as
external observers. Not being immersed in the layout could
have allowed participants to adopt the imagined perspec-
tive and maintain it in working memory even when it
preceded the target. Moreover, the perceptual availability
of the layout throughout the trial could have made easier
the maintenance of the perspective in working memory,
causing the reduction in disparity effects in the advance-
viewpoint condition (Exp. 1), and their complete elimina-
tion in the corresponding condition with a non-spatial
response (Exp. 2). The persisting angular disparity effect in
Exp. 1 could reflect the difficulty in mapping verbal spatial
labels to space from imagined perspectives (see Avraa-
mides and Sofroniou 2006).
In Avraamides et al. (2013), we described another
experiment (Exp. 1) that resembled that of Sohn and
Carlson (2003), albeit with a memory task, three-dimen-
sional stimuli, and pointing responses. Participants viewed
the virtual environment on a desktop computer and used
the mouse to turn around to observe the objects during
study. Testing was also carried out on desktop computer in
a different laboratory. Results from this experiment indi-
cated that advance-viewpoint information led to a reduc-
tion in angular disparity effects, but only for canonical
perspectives; no benefits were observed for diagonal
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perspectives other than an overall reduction in response
latency compared to an advance-target and a simultaneous
presentation condition. This finding suggests that in the
absence of perceptual support, maintaining an imagined
perspective in working memory is difficult, especially for
perspectives that are misaligned with the egocentric ref-
erence frame. However, the use of a body-based pointing
response in this experiment (vs. verbal labels) allows the
possibility that the reduction in the angular disparity effect
in canonical orientations stemmed from the easier trans-
formation of the computed response vector to body coor-
dinates. Further research is needed to distinguish these
explanations.
Conclusion
We propose here that the main difficulty people face with
mental perspective-taking in remembered environments
relates to maintaining the perspective in working memory.
Adopting a perspective mentally requires time, which is
reflected in angular disparity effects. Providing advance
information about a perspective allows the observer, under
certain situations, to adopt and maintain the perspective in
anticipation of further information. However, maintaining
an imagined perspective is difficult when spatial conflicts
arise from strong sensorimotor cues, as when reasoning
about one’s immediate surroundings. Although our pro-
posal is compatible with findings from previous studies, it
still needs to be evaluated by systematic research. Under-
standing the difficulties associated with reasoning from
perspectives other than our own and developing methods to
counteract those difficulties is essential nowadays when an
increasing number of modern technologies involve such
reasoning (e.g., tele-operating drones and robots).
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